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Abstract 
This paper aims to measure and compare the economic performance of four Asian economies who 
adopted Inflation Targeting (Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) against their six 
neighboring Asian non-targeting economies (China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Pakistan). Using the methodology of Ball and Sheridan, firstly, behavior of inflation, output growth and 
short term interest rate has been measured for both groups (Targeters vs. Non-Targeters) in pre and 
post IT adoption period in order to see whether performance has improved in targeting countries after 
the adoption of IT. Secondly, we try to find out whether Inflation Targeting has played any significant 
role in the changed behavior of these variables. Thirdly, we measure the effect of output gap and 
supply shock on inflation and see whether economic structure of these countries has changed 
between pre and post targeting period; and then we measure the role of IT in the structural change 
of these economies if there is any. The results force us to believe that economic performance has 
improved in all Asian economies in post targeting period. However, IT does not seem to play any 
significant role in this improvement of targeting countries. In addition to this, we find strong evidence 
that all variables showed strong reversion to mean suggesting that improved performance of variables 
today is in fact the outcome of poor economic performance in the past.  
Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Asian countries, Output gap, Targeters vs Non Targeters, Economic 
Performance 
JEL Classification: E30, E31, E52, E58  
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I: Introduction 
In 1980s, the monetary policy framework became a difficult task for monetary authorities around the 
world due to the instability of the demand for money function and this issue opened new avenue of 
debates among economists. The journey that started from the time inconsistency problem and led to 
rule vs. discretion debate emerged in the form of Inflation Targeting Framework (IT or ITF). Since 
then, there is an ongoing debate concerning the benefits of IT framework for both developed and 
emerging economies.  
 
The debate that “Inflation Targeting matters” is yet inconclusive even after almost 20 years’ 
experience with Inflation targeting. The experience of countries has been documented extensively 
starting with the early work of Leiderman and Svensson in 1995.  Economists have worked on 
different dimensions of Inflation Targeting, most importantly looking at the impact of IT strategy on 
macro-economic variables (output volatility, and output gap), inflation level, inflation persistence, 
inflation expectations, cost of disinflation, and the conduct of monetary policy. Those (Mishkin and 
Posen, 1997; Neumann and Hagen, 2002; Corbo et al., 2002; Levin et al., 2004; Bernanke et al., 
1999; Johnson, 2002, 2003), who brought optimistic evidence about the good performance of 
Inflation Targeting, argue that IT is associated with low rate of inflation, curb the volatility of inflation 
and output, anchor inflation expectation, and reduce inflation persistence.  
 
However these empirical studies reviewed fail to produce convincing evidence. An important challenge 
is the economic environment of 1990s, a period friendly to price stability (Neumann and von Hagen, 
2002; Sikklos, 1999), and inflation was on a downward trend in many countries, especially developed 
countries, prior to adoption of IT. Moreover, non-IT countries also went through the same experience 
as IT countries (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999). Ball and Sheridan (2003), in their thought provoking 
paper “Does Inflation Targeting Matter?”, kept reservation about the improved performance of 
Inflation Targeters against Non-Targeters while comparing the economic performance of 20 OECD 
countries (7 Targeters vs. 13 Non-Targeters).  
 
Following the methodology of Ball and Sheridan, Batini and Laxton (2007) and Gonçalves and Salles 
(2008) compared the economic performance of emerging economies (Targeters vs. Non-Targeters) 
keeping this conjecture in mind that “it is entirely possible that IT has not brought gains for developed 
countries as these countries are not suffering from severe inflation problems and destabilizing 
macroeconomic disturbances to begin with, but IT may have enhanced macroeconomic performance 
of developing countries”. Gonçalves and Salles (2008) found that those emerging economies who 
adopted IT framework experienced greater reduction in inflation and GDP growth variability, even 
after controlling for mean reversion. Batini and Laxton (2007) also reported similar results by saying 
that Inflation targeting appears to have been associated with lower inflation, lower inflation 
expectations, and lower inflation volatility.  
 
However, many economists found less strong empirical evidence in favor of Inflation targeting even in 
the case of emerging economies. Fraga et al (2003) shows that emerging economies working within 
an IT framework have high volatilities of output, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate than 
developed countries using IT. Berument and Yuksel (2006) also suggest that the empirical support for 
the lower inflation and its variability for the inflation targeting regimes are limited. A strict argument 
against IT in emerging economies has been given by Bystedt and Brito (2008). They say that although 
there is some relation between IT and lower inflation, this relation seems weaker than previously 
affirmed in the literature. More important, in opposition to the previous views that IT adoption was 
costless in term of output growth, they showed that there is a negative significant relation between IT 
adoption and output growth to be taken into account for purposes of evaluation of the IT policy. 
Angeriz and Arestis (2005b) says that our evidence of IT in emerging economies, though, suggests 
that non-IT central banks have also been successful in achieving and maintaining consistently low 
inflation rate. This evidence clearly implies that an emerging country central bank does not need to 
pursue IT strategy to achieve and maintain low inflation.  
 
Our study is in direct comparison with Batini and Laxton (2007) and Goncalves and Salles (2008). 
These two studies followed the methodology of Ball and Sheridan and used emerging economies as 
their sample set.  In this paper, we are following the same methodology but with specific focus on the 
Asian neighboring economies. Our sample includes ten Asian countries China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand (three developed, 
seven emerging3). We divide them in to two groups: inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters’; 
where Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand are inflation targeters and others are non-IT 
countries. These countries are interesting to analyze because of the increasing role of these 
economies (especially China and India) in world’s economies. The basic intuition to select Asian 
countries is that these countries share common characteristics that facilitate a comparative analysis, 
and the most important characteristic is that the Asian crisis (1997 - 99) that marked our sample 
period mainly affected Asian countries and allow us to test the vulnerability of different monetary 
policy regimes in order to decide whether Inflation Targeting countries out-performed non-targeting 
countries. Another benefit from this sample selection (1987 – 2007) is that four Inflation Targeters in 
our sample adopted ITF in late 90s and early 2000.  This eliminates the criticism that improved 
performance was the result of having an environment friendly to price stability at the time of IT 
adoption and after its adoption (Siklos, 1999 ); and giving IT strategy a complete chance to prove its 
significance in improving the economic performance of IT countries. 
 
We have examined uni-variate and multivariate behavior of inflation, output and interest rate (broadly 
denoted by symbol X) using Difs-in-Difs strategy. In uni-variate analysis, we first find the averages of 
inflation, output growth and interest rate in pre and post targeting periods and then we try to find 
whether the change in these variables in the post and pre targeting periods ( − 	) has 
anything to do with IT framework or not. Overall, we find no evidence that inflation targeting plays 
any significant role in improved economic performance. If we examine inflation targeters and non-
targeters separately, we find that almost all measures of economic performance have improved for 
two groups in post targeting period (Post targeting period in the case of non-inflation targeters is 
defined as the average of the adoption time period of inflation targeters. In our sample, this average 
comes out to be 2002 Q2. However, we have tested our results with different dates for non-
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targeters). For example, average inflation fell between pre-targeting and targeting period, inflation 
variability decreased, and in addition output growth rose while growth variability decreased. But 
when, we examined whether this improvement in economic performance is due to Inflation Targeting 
Framework, we find no convincing evidence.  In multivariate analysis, we try to find whether Inflation 
Targeting has changed the economic structure of targeters or not. We estimate the effect of output 
gap and supply shock on change in inflation in both pre and post targeting period and then analyze 
whether this behavior has changed after the adoption of IT in targeting countries. Our results are 
inconclusive regarding multivariate results and IT seems to be insignificant in affecting the structure of 
the economies in these countries.     
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section II describes our data and methodology for 
measuring the effect of Inflation Targeting. Section III presents our uni-variate results concerning 
average inflation, inflation variability, average output growth, output growth variability and short term 
interest rate variability. We find that IT does not have significant effect on any of these measures. In 
line with Ball and Sheridan (2003), there are occasional hints that targeting has beneficial effects and 
occasional hints of adverse effects. Section IV examined the effect of inflation targeting on two 
bivariate relations: slope of output-inflation tradeoff and inflationary effect of supply shock following 
Ball and Sheridan (2005). Here our results are also imprecise and suggest no note worthy impact of 
Inflation Targeting. Section V presents our results of emerging economies. We estimate uni-variate 
regression after excluding developed countries from our sample in order to test the assumption that 
IT can be a beneficial strategy for emerging economies, but our findings do not change as far as the 
emerging economies of Asia are concerned and Section VI concludes our results.  
 
II: Data and Methodology 
We have selected a sample of ten Asian countries: China, India, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. These countries are interesting to analyze 
as they share some common characteristics and they employ different monetary policy regimes as 
well; providing us the opportunity to compare inflation targeting against different monetary policy 
regimes4.  
• South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand are Inflation Targeters 
• China and Pakistan are Monetary Aggregate Targeters  
• Hong Kong and Singapore are Exchange Rate Targeters  
• India and Malaysia are Multiple Targeters 
 
Following the methodology of Ball and Sheridan (2003); we are interested in comparing the 
performance of economic variables of inflation targeters before and after the adoption of Inflation 
Targeting framework. Then, we’ll compare the performance of these targeting countries with those of 
non-targeters (control group) in order to test whether targeting matters? Ball and Sheridan used the 
following Difs-in-Difs strategy to determine the effect of inflation targeting on economic variables 
while considering the problem of correlation between pre-targeting period variable (	) and dummy 
variable 
 and also taking account of mean reversion problem.   
 −  	 =   + 
 +  	 +                                 (1) 
Here, X means any economic variable like average inflation, average output growth, inflation 
variability, output variability, and interest rate variability. Pre subscript indicates the time period before 
the adoption of ITF and post subscript indicates the time period after the adoption of ITF. D is the 
dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the country is a targeter and 0 if it is non-targeter. This 
equation measures the difference in average inflation rate (for example) between the two time 
periods (post minus pre) as the function of inflation targeting framework (dummy variable D) and pre 
targeting period’s average inflation (	).   
Our sample ranges from 1987:1 to 2007:4, a 20 years period. Although these countries except Hong 
Kong were included in the sample of Gonçalves and Salles (2008) but our sample is more focused; 
also they used annual data, whereas our data is based on quarterly frequency. Another significant 
difference is that they considered Indonesia as Non-Targeting country, whereas we take Indonesia as 
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Inflation Targeter as it adopted Inflation Targeting in 20005. In order to run the above mentioned 
regression for different variables; we have taken four sample periods, three are pre targeting and one 
is post targeting sample. 
 
Sample 1 Pre Targeting sample 
 
(1987 Q1 to 1993 Q4) 
 
Sample 2 Pre Targeting sample 
 
(1994 Q1 to 2000 Q2 for Non-IT 
countries); and 
(1994 Q1 to IT adoption date for IT 
countries) 
 
Sample 3 Post Targeting Sample 
 
(2000 Q3 to 2007 Q4 for Non-IT 
countries) and 
(IT adoption date to 2007 Q4 for IT 
countries) 
 
Sample 4 Pre Targeting Sample* 
Robust Test sample excluding time 
period of Asian Crisis 
 
*The time period selected for our study is hit by two world renowned shocks: one was the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992-93 and the second was The Asian Crisis of 1997-99. As shown 
by interest rate movement in Graph 3, there was no significant movement or turbulence in interest 
rate during ERM crisis, so we can say that this crisis did not affect Asian countries and need not to be 
considered in re-arranging our sample. As far as Asian Crisis of 1997 is concerned; this crisis severely 
affected the countries included in our sample as shown by the trends of inflation rate, Real GDP 
growth rate, interest rate and output gap in Graph 1, 2, 3 and 4. So, we re-arranged our pre targeting 
sample in order to take out the effect of Asian Crisis. Asian crisis hit Asia in July 1997 and lasted up to 
1999. That’s why; we have thrown out few troublesome outliers from 1997:3 to 1999:26.     
Table 1 summarizes the starting and ending dates of pre and post targeting periods for both IT 
countries and Non-IT countries. As far as the demarcation of pre and post targeting period for IT 
countries is concerned, break date is simple as their post targeting period starts when they adopted IT 
framework.7 However, this demarcation is not a simple task for non-inflation targeters. While no 
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partitioning of sample is perfect; we follow Ball and Sheridan (2003). The starting date for the non-
targeting countries in the case of post-targeting period is calculated as the average of the adoption 
date of targeting countries.  Batini and Laxton (2007), who used the partitioning approach of Ball and 
Sheridan (2003) and some other partitions of sample as well, reported that in all cases results do not 
differ significantly.  
 
III: Uni-variate Results 
A. Inflation Targeting and Inflation 
The rationale of inflation targeting framework is that in long run, inflation rate is the only macro-
economic variable that Monetary Policy (MP) can affect and even moderate inflation rate is harmful for 
economic efficiency and growth. So, the first question being considered is whether adopting Inflation 
Targeting affects inflation or not?  Inflation variability is also important to analyze as economists have 
almost consensus about its negative impact on the most important economic variables, like output and 
growth rate via different channels. 
Average Inflation: Average/mean inflation rate is calculated as quarterly growth rate on year-on-
year basis from Consumer Price Index (IMF International Financial Statistics), in other words, we 
calculate the percentage change in CPI with its value from the corresponding quarter in previous year. 
Table 2 reports our results of average inflation for targeters and non-targeters for each country for 
three different sample periods. In sample 1, the average inflation for targeters and non-targeters is 
almost the same that is 7, 1465% for non-targeters and 7, 2751% for targeters.  
In sample 2, the average inflation for non-targeters is low (5.7227%) as compared to sample 1; 
whereas the average inflation is high in targeting countries (9.004%) that is in agreement with the 
finding of Ball and Sheridan; that before the adoption of inflation targeting, these countries were 
facing high inflation. But we cannot ignore the fact that one possible reason for this high inflation 
among targeters is Indonesia, whose average inflation was 18.9837% during this time period. The 
reason for this double digit inflation is the Asian Crisis of 1998 that affected Indonesia severely. 
In sample 3, in the post targeting period, the average inflation for all countries: targeters and non-
targeters is at decreasing trend, where the average inflation for targeters is 4.80545 whereas, this 
figure is 2.422145 (half of targeters) in case of non-targeters. Even if we exclude Indonesia (the high 
inflation country) from our sample of targeters, the average inflation is still 3.3849; indicating larger 
reduction for targeters as compared to non-targeters.  In order to see, whether this decrease in 
inflation rate in targeting countries is due to the adoption of ITF; we run the regression (1) for 
average inflation.  
After controlling for the possibility of mean reversion, we find out that regression to the mean is quite 
strong as the co-efficient is -0.55102; and it is statistically significant at less than 1 percent level of 
significance. Whereas, the estimated co-efficient of IT dummy variable is 0.91171, which means that 
IT is having a negative impact on inflation (meaning that IT is causing increase in average inflation) 
but it has weak statistical significance (t=0.9387 and p-value= 0.3791). This model explains the 
variation in inflation changes well as the  of this regression is 0.81. The targeting countries were 
having high initial inflation and the reason for large decrease in inflation is regression to mean rather 
than ITF.  
As Graph 1 shows that Indonesia is the country having abnormal inflation that causes an increase in 
the average inflation rate of targeters, we run regression (1) excluding Indonesia. As shown by Table 
2, our results change after excluding Indonesia. The co-efficient of IT dummy becomes negative 
opposing our first finding that IT causes increase in inflation. But this co-efficient is still insignificant as 
before. As far as regression to mean is concerned, this co-efficient is now very strong (a2= -1.1318) 
and with statistical significance (P-value=0.0467) confirming the initial conclusion that decrease in 
inflation is due to regression to mean rather than ITF.  
Inflation Variability: Inflation variability is measured as the standard deviation of inflation rate. We 
have calculated standard deviation of inflation for each country for each sample periods and the 
results are reported in Table 3.  
The inflation variability was high in pre-targeting period for both targeters (7.477%) and non-
targeters (4.091%). This variability has reduced in post targeting periods where this variability is 
1.635% for non-targeters and 2.362% for targeters.  Although, the variability decreased more in 
targeters as compared to non-targeters, but once we control for regression to mean, then we find out 
that the reason for this greater decrease was simply high initial inflation variability. The co-efficient of 
initial inflation variability is -0.8761 and is highly statistically significant (p-value= 0.0000).  
As far as the effect of inflation targeting on inflation variability is considered, we found the same 
result as in the case of average inflation. After controlling for the regression to mean, inflation 
targeting is in fact raising inflation variability (co-efficient= 0.3076) but this estimate is not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.3876) forcing us to keep reservations about the negative impact of IT on 
inflation variability. We also run this regression after excluding Indonesia from our sample but our 
results remain the same. There is reversion to mean (a2=-0.8773, P-Value=0.0000) and IT has 
statistically no beneficial effects on inflation variability.  
Gonçalves et Salles (2008) while comparing the performance of 36 emerging economies using the 
methodology of Ball and Sheridan, claim that countries that adopted IT experienced larger reduction 
in inflation, but in line with Ball and Sheridan (2003), Berument and Yuksel (2007) and Lin and Ye 
(2007); we found no clear evidence that IT has a relationship with reduced average inflation in case 
of targeting countries of Asia. As far as inflation variability is concerned, our empirical work suggests 
that IT adoption increases inflation variability but this finding bears less statistical support. Therefore, 
the empirical support for the lower inflation and its variability for the inflation targeting regime are 
limited. 
B. Inflation Targeting and Output Growth 
The basic monetary framework generally implies that policymakers face a trade-off between inflation 
volatility and real economic volatility and Inflation Targeting has been criticized for its perceived focus 
on inflation (Friedman and Kuttner (1996)).  However, Bernanke et al. (1999) conclude that “output 
and employment remain concerns of policy-makers after the switch to inflation targeting can be seen 
in the fact that all the targeting countries have undertaken disinflation only gradually, to avoid putting 
undue pressure on the real economy (p.291)”.  These arguments suggest that although there is 
ambiguous link between IT and output growth, but IT do consider that output should grow and its 
volatility should be minimized. So, the next question is related to the impact of inflation targeting on 
output growth, its variability and output gap variability. We estimate whether IT has increased the 
variability of output in an effort to reduce inflation variability? 
 
Average Output Growth: The quarterly growth rates are calculated on year-on-year basis by taking 
forth lagged difference of natural logarithms of Real GDP.  
Table 4 shows our results of average growth rate. The average growth rate increased for both 
targeters and non-targeters in post targeting period. In order to test the hypothesis that inflation 
targeting has positive impact on output growth, we run the regression (1) on output growth. 
The results indicate that inflation targeting has negative impact on average growth rate. The 
estimated effect is -0.5676 but this is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.5683). Even after 
excluding Indonesia from sample, our findings do not change. The co-efficient of IT dummy is still 
having negative sign (but with no statistical significance) and reversion to mean is significant.  
Output Growth Variability: Table 5 reports our results of output variability measured as the 
standard deviation of output growth. Output variability is less in targeting countries in pre and post 
targeting periods as compared to non-targeters. To see the effect of inflation targeting on output 
growth variability, we run regression (1) on output variability. Our results indicate that Inflation 
targeting helps in reducing output variability as the sign of the co-efficient is negative. But this effect 
is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.4455) even up to 40 percent level of significance. Whereas, 
the co-efficient of initial output variability is strong (co-efficient = 0.7602) and is also statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance (p-value = 0.0076).   When Indonesia is excluded from the 
sample, our results still indicate that IT does not increase output growth variability.  
Output Gap Variability: The next variable that we considered is output gap variability. Output gap 
is calculated as the difference between real GDP and potential GDP (calculated by applying Hoddrick-
Prescott Filter on real GDP). The output gap variability is calculated as the standard deviation of 
output gap. Table 6 reports the results of averages of output gap volatility across countries and across 
different time periods. 
The averages of output gap volatility are the same in case of targeters and non-targeters and there is 
no noteworthy difference. The output gap volatility has decreased in the post targeting period for both 
groups. To estimate the effect of inflation targeting on output gap volatility, we run regression (1) on 
output gap volatility. The regression estimates indicate that IT has reduced output gap volatility but 
this effect is not statistically significant as the p-value is 0.2524. As far as mean to regression is 
considered, like all other variables being considered, this estimate is significant at less than 1% level 
of significance. So, we do not find conclusive evidence about the positive effect of IT on output gap 
volatility. Excluding Indonesia does not make any worth mentioning difference. The sign of co-
efficients are the same and this does not change the statistical significance of co-efficients.     
Although there is no theoretical and empirical consensus about the overall impact of IT on output 
growth, it is well accepted that all IT central banks “not only aim at stabilizing inflation around the 
target but also put some weight on stabilizing the real economy” (Svensson, 2007, p. 1). 
Results reported by Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Bystedt and Brito (2008) indicate negative effect of 
IT on output growth and its variability whereas, some like Mollick et al. (2008) find positive impact of 
IT on output growth. While considering this variable, we found that IT has negative impact on output 
growth but this relationship is not statistically significant. As far as output variability and output gap 
variability are concerned, our results indicate that IT does not raise these variabilities in targeting 
countries but this conclusion is imprecise as there is less statistical significance for this result. 
C. Inflation Targeting and Short term Interest Rate 
The next variable is short term interest rate. We have taken interbank rates from IMF – International 
Financial statistics on quarterly basis. As this is the major instrument in the hands of monetary 
authorities to control inflation. So its behavior can tell about the responsiveness of monetary 
authorities.  
Interest Rate Variability: Table 7 reports our results of interest rate variability. The path of 
average interest rate variability is smooth is case of non-targeters (2.6453 for sample 1, 2.6342 for 
sample 2 and 2.5452 for sample 3), whereas the interest rates were very volatile for targeters before 
the adoption of inflation targeting. Even if we exclude Indonesia from our sample, whose interest rate 
volatility was 20.2227% during this period, still the variability is high for targeters (4.0421% excluding 
Indonesia) before adopting Inflation targeting. One possible reason for this high variability can be the 
Asian crisis of 1997. After the adoption of ITF, the interest rate variability has decreased tremendously 
(1.9759%) in targeting countries. In order to test whether IT caused this decrease in interest rate 
volatility, we run our regression on this variable for each sample period.  
The results of our regression show that IT reduces interest rate volatility in targeting countries, but 
the estimated co-efficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.3711). As far as, the estimate of 
initial interest rate volatility is concerned, it shows that there is regression to mean and it is 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance (p-value = 0.0025) indicating that larger reduction in 
interest rate volatility is due to the larger initial variability.  However, when we exclude Indonesia from 
sample, the initial values become insignificant along with IT co-efficient. One possible reason for this 
can be inflation targeters do not respond strongly to inflation movement questioning the activism of 
monetary authorities in these countries. However, there can be other factors for these less volatile 
interest rates (for example, low inflation worldwide, Golden Decade (1998 - 2007) for financial 
institutions etc.).  
D. Uni-variate Robustness Check  
We run different robustness checks on our sample. First of all, we re-arranged our sample in order to 
take out the effect of Asian Crisis of 1997 as this time period resulted in outliers in our sample data. 
Our results indicate that this controlled sample does not change any relationship and the statistical 
significance of any variable being estimated. Secondly, we test the sensitivity of our estimates to 
different demarcation dates between pre and post targeting period for non-targeting countries. Not 
surprisingly, we did not find any change in our previous results. Thus, our robust finding is that IT 
seems to be insignificant in the improvement of economic performance of Asian countries and many 
of our findings are in agreement with those, who claim that IT is somehow imposing cost on economic 
growth (although not statistically significant); and the improvement of economic variables in targeting 
countries is perhaps due to some factor other than Inflation Targeting framework.  
  
IV: Bivariate Analysis 
After the uni-variate analysis, we now move to multivariate analysis again following the methodology 
of Ball and Sheridan, 2005. We are interested in estimating the effect of output gap on change in 
inflation and effect of supply shock on change in inflation. We run these regressions in pre and post 
targeting periods in order to see whether there is any change in the structure and patterns of these 
effects and whether Inflation Targeting played any role in this change if change exists. 
∆ = ( − ∗)                                                     (2) 
∆ =   +  (∆ −  !)                               (3)     
Here ∗ is the potential output (measured by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing 
parameter 1600),  is the quarterly index of all commodity prices (average) in US dollar from The 
Economists,  ! is the quarterly inflation rate of USA. Equation (2) measures the effect of output gap 
on change in inflation whereas; equation (3) shows the effect of change in relative commodity prices 
after controlling for inflation in USA (as indicator of supply shock). The expected movement of “a” is 
debatable because “a” can fall  if inflation becomes more anchored in targeting countries and “a” can 
rise if inflation reduces cost of disinflation (Corbo et al., 2002); whereas "" should be falling for 
Targeters as Inflation Targeting reduces the effect of supply shocks.  
In addition to estimate any change in co-efficients, we are also interested in estimating whether 
Inflation Targeting played any role in the change in the co-efficients between post and pre targeting 
periods. Therefore, we estimated the following equations. 
 − 	 = $ + %& 
'(( +  )                                       (4) 
+,-. – +01 = $ + %& 
'(( +  )                             (5) 
A. Inflation and Output Gap 
The results of equation (2) are imprecise. The individual analysis of countries shows that these 
countries differ in their structures of economy. The effect of output gap on inflation varies across 
countries and across time.  
 After the adoption of ITF, the co-efficient of output gap has decreased in Targeters as well as for non-
targeters. One possible explanation for this can be that the sensitivity of inflation to output gap has 
decreased and inflation has become more anchored. When we estimate whether Inflation Targeting 
has played any role in the change of this structure, we find that after the exclusion of Asian Crisis time 
period, IT has a strong effect with IT co-efficient= -20.9801 (P-value=0.0002) meaning that adoption 
of IT results in the decrease of sensitivity of inflation to output gap. But this result is just because of a 
sharp decline of the co-efficient of output gap in Indonesia. Once we exclude Indonesia from our 
sample, we get the same result that IT seems to be unimportant for any change in the structure of 
economy.   
B. Inflation and Supply Shock 
As far as the effect of supply shock on inflation is concerned, our findings suggest that co-efficients 
differ across countries and over time. The effect of supply shock on inflation is different as this effect 
is sometimes positive and sometime negative for individual country.  
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 The weighted average of the co-efficient of supply shock among targeters and non-targeters shows 
that the structure of economy has not changed significantly as inflation response to commodity prices 
is quite similar way. However, this co-efficient is negative in case of Targeters. One possible 
interpretation for this result can be that the central banks in targeting countries over react to any 
supply shock and this trend has not changed even after the adoption of Inflation Targeting.  In 
contrast, we do not find any evidence that Inflation Targeting plays any significant role in the change 
of this co-efficient and this effect between pre and post targeting period.  
V: Case of Emerging Economies 
This section is based on the assumption that “IT can be a beneficial framework for emerging market 
economies even if it is not beneficial for developed countries”. The above analysis was based on ten 
Asian countries, in which three were developed countries (Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea) 
and seven were emerging economies. Now, we consider only emerging economies in order to test 
assumption proposed by Gonçalves and Salles (2008) of fruitfulness of IT strategy for emerging 
economies. This leaves us with four non-inflation targeting countries (China, India, Malaysia and 
Pakistan) and three inflation targeting countries (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand).   
In this section, we have estimated uni-variate regression (1) following the same methodology as we 
considered in case of ten Asian countries and results are presented in Table 9.  The definition of the 
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sample is the same as previously mentioned; the only difference is the exclusion of three developed 
countries for analysis purpose.  
The economic performance of targeters has improved in post targeting period.  
Average Inflation ↓ Inflation Variability ↓ 
Average Output Growth ↑ Output Growth Variability ↓ 
Interest Rate Variability ↓ Variability of Output Gap ↓ 
 
If we exclude the time period of Asian Crisis (period of outliers in data), then overall performance is 
positive in post targeting period in comparison to pre targeting period except that there is a decrease 
of 1% in output growth and the magnitude of benefit is small.  
As far as the economic performance of non-targeters is concerned, their performance has also been 
better in post targeting period. 
Average Inflation ↓ Inflation Variability ↓ 
Average Output Growth ↑ Output Growth Variability ↓ 
Interest Rate Variability ↓ Variability of Output Gap ↓ 
 
Even after the exclusion of Asian crisis’ period from our sample, the overall performance of non-
targeters is positive in line with targeters and average growth fell as well, but one noteworthy 
difference is that the fall in output growth is very minor in case of non-targeters (from 6.92% to 
6.81%) instead of 1% fall in targeting countries. 
Looking at the effect of Inflation Targeting on the measures of economic performance, we find that 
for average inflation and inflation variability, the co-efficient of IT Dummy is positive, indicating 
negative effect of Inflation Targeting (although it is not statistically significant in any case). This forces 
us to infer that improved performance of inflation in Targeters in post targeting period is not due to 
adoption of Inflation Targeting rather there were some other factors and there was also reversion to 
mean.  For output growth measure, the effect of inflation targeting on average output growth is 
indefinite but the impact of IT on growth volatility is positive. This indicates that IT helps in reducing 
the volatility of output growth in targeting countries but this finding is not statistically significant.  As 
far as interest rate variability is concerned, our results indicate that IT reduces the variability of 
interest rate but this co-efficient is also insignificant forcing us to keep our reservations on questioning 
the activism of monetary authorities.  
In a nutshell, we can say that there is no vital difference in the economic performance of targeters 
and non-targeters in post targeting period. As far as the role of Inflation Targeting in the change in 
the economic performance is concerned, we find no significant effect of Inflation targeting on any 
economic variable even in the case of emerging economies.   
VI: Conclusion 
This study is our first endeavor to measure the economic performance of Asian countries in particular; 
as the prospects and the role of these countries (especially China and India) in the world’s economy 
are mounting rapidly. One benefit provided by this sample is that the average of the adoption period 
is 2000 for non-targeters that is the date of adoption of targeting for two out of four targeting 
countries. This enables us to start the comparison between these two groups, while being in almost 
the same world’s economic environment and trends. 
Our findings suggest that performance of both groups have improved in post 2000 period. But the role 
of Inflation Targeting in improved economic performance in Targeting countries does not come out to 
be significant. One important finding is that the central banks in targeting countries do not strongly 
respond to inflation movement as indicated by reduced interest rate volatility in targeting countries in 
post targeting period. This questions the activism of monetary authorities in these countries.  
Although, we do not find evidence that IT improves performance as reported by Gonçalves and Salles 
(2008) and Batini and Laxton (2007); but at the same time, we do not find any statistical evidence 
that IT is harmful for an economy. This can be interpreted as: “in Asian economies, our data does not 
support the case for Inflation targeting”.  
Our findings suffer from this fact that these countries are different in their economic structure (see 
bivariate results), we plan to address this issue in our forthcoming paper in order to analyze where 
these countries show symmetry and where they are different from each other.   
  
Appendix I: 
Graph 1: Inflation Rate (Sample: 1987:1 – 2007:4)8 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Real GDP Growth rate (Sample: 1987:1 – 2007:4) 
 
 
  
                                                           
8
 CHN means China, HK means Hong Kong, IND means India, MAL means Malaysia, SIN means Singapore, PAK 
means Pakistan, INS means Indonesia, PHI means Philippines, SK means South Korea and THA means Thailand.  
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 Graph 3: Short Term Interest Rate (Sample 1987:1 – 2007:4) 
 
 
 
Graph 4: Output Gap (Sample 1987:1 – 2007:4)9 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
9
 Output gap is the difference between Real GDP and Potential GDP where Potential GDP is taken as the trend 
series by applying Hodrick-Prescott Filter to Real GDP.  
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Appendix II: 
Table 1: Sample Periods10 
 
Country   Sample 1 
Pre 
Sample 2  
Pre 
Sample 3 
Post 
Sample 411 
Pre 
CHN Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
IND Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
HK Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
MAL Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
SIN Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
PAK Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q3 1987 Q1 
  End 1993 Q4 2000 Q2 2007 Q4 2000 Q2 
      
INS Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2000 Q1 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 1999 Q4 2007 Q4 1999 Q4 
      
PHI Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2002 Q1 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 2001 Q4 2007 Q4 2001 Q4 
      
SK Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 1998 Q2 1987 Q1 
 End 1993 Q4 1998 Q1 2007 Q4 1998 Q1 
      
THA Start 1987 Q1 1994 Q1 2000 Q2 1987 Q1 
  End 1993 Q4 2000 Q1 2007 Q4 2000 Q1 
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 The adoption dates for Targeters in Sample 3 are taken from HKIMR (Hong Kong Institute of Monetary 
Research) Occasional Paper No. 1, March 2004; whereas the starting date of Sample 3 for non-targeters is the 
average of the adoption date of IT of the targeters. 
 
11
 The values from 1997:3 to 1999:2 have been excluded to be more precise in restriction 
Table 2: Mean Inflation Rate (Year-on-Year Basis)12 
Country Sample 1 Sample2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 10.3257 7.7251 1.7360 10.7335 
HK 9.0921 4.0840 -0.5331 7.4691 
IND 9.4114 8.7513 4.5133 8.9498 
MAL 2.9684 3.4253 2.0155 3.0316 
SIN 2.2625 1.3004 0.9572 2.0522 
PAK 8.8191 9.0505 5.8440 9.2977 
INS 8.3205 18.9837 8.7701 8.0531 
PHI 9.9776 6.8020 4.8611 8.2382 
SK 6.4051 5.2598 3.0620 5.9715 
THA 4.3970 4.9562 2.5286 4.4174 
     
Averages:     
NIT  7.1465 5.7228 2.4221 6.9224 
IT 7.2751 9.0004 4.8055 6.6701 
Excluding INS 6.9266 5.6727 3.4839 6.2091 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in mean Inflation between Samples 
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 – 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  
Constant        a0 0.3157 -0.1472 6.0126 4.6120 5.0877 
P-Value  0.8927 0.8634 0.0794 0.1662 0.1542 
      
IT Dummy     a1 2.3454 0.9117 -0.4403 -0.3806 0.8500 
P-Value 0.1930 0.3791 0.8505 0.8766 0.7195 
      
Initial Value  a2 -0.7052 -0.5510 -0.5510 -1.1318 -1.1776 
P-Value 0.0404 0.0011 0.0011 0.0467 0.0241 
      
R-Square 
 
0.5399 0.8080 0.6908 0.5103 0.5478 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.4085 0.7531 0.5878 0.3471 0.4186 
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 The calculations have been done using methodology of Ball & Sheridan, 2005 
Table 3: Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate13 
Country Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 7.7291 9.7772 1.9728 8.4647 
HK 1.8299 5.1845 2.1034 4.2351 
IND 2.9044 3.5914 1.1939 2.9966 
MAL 1.3871 1.1099 0.9253 1.1912 
SIN 1.0844 1.2562 1.0164 1.0497 
PAK 2.7388 3.6254 2.6001 3.1947 
INS 1.6205 22.6089 4.2402 1.9419 
PHI 4.6908 3.2429 2.0897 4.5283 
SK 2.2786 1.2602 1.5517 2.0111 
THA 1.4085 2.7951 1.5682 1.7733 
     
Averages     
NIT  2.9456 4.0908 1.6353 3.5221 
IT 2.4996 7.4768 2.3625 2.5637 
Excluding INS 2.7926 2.4327 1.7365 2.7710 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in standard deviation of Inflation between Samples 
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  
Constant        a0 1.4782 1.1285 1.2929 1.1332 1.2312 
P-Value 0.0542 0.0017 0.0135 0.0229 0.1339 
      
IT Dummy     a1 0.7509 0.3076 0.1190 0.3047 0.6796 
P-Value 0.2897 0.3867 0.7832 0.4743 0.3690 
      
Initial Value  a2 -0.9467 -0.8761 -0.8837 -0.8773 -0.8852 
P-Value 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 
      
R-Square 0.8360 0.9941 0.9321 0.9645 0.8281 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.7892 0.9924 0.9095 0.9526 0.7790 
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  The calculations have been done using methodology of Ball & Sheridan, 2005 
Table 4: Average Growth Rate (Year-on-Year Basis)14 
Country Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 9.6250 8.3150 9.6074 9.2969 
HK 5.2689 2.7390 4.8700 5.1763 
IND 3.9417 5.8478 7.2338 4.8626 
MAL 8.7721 5.9239 5.1239 8.8617 
SIN 9.0405 6.8146 5.5313 9.006 
PAK 5.2168 3.3551 5.2689 4.6515 
INS 6.4533 2.5741 4.8168 6.2792 
PHI 2.8619 3.6120 5.1122 3.482 
SK 8.0052 5.7433 4.3690 7.5536 
THA 9.6616 2.3145 5.1138 8.2239 
     
Averages     
NIT  6.9775 5.4992 6.2726 6.9758 
IT 6.7455 3.5610 4.8530 6.3847 
Excluding INS 6.8429 3.8899 4.8650 6.4198 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in mean Growth rate between Samples 
      
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  
Constant       a0 5.5569 3.8554 5.5573 3.7532 5.0076 
P-Value 0.0099 0.0287 0.0175 0.0497 0.0257 
      
IT Dummy    a1 -1.3958 -0.5676 -1.3938 -0.6703 -1.0821 
P-Value 0.2045 0.5683 0.2820 0.5497 0.3047 
      
Initial Value a2 -0.8974 -0.5604 -0.8975 -0.5419 -0.8186 
P-Value 0.0035 0.0498 0.0072 0.0814 0.0110 
      
R-Square 0.7408 0.4613 0.7398 0.4241 0.6342 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.6667 0.3073 0.6531 0.2321 0.5296 
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  The calculations have been done using methodology of Ball & Sheridan, 2005 
Table 5: Growth Rate Variability (measured as standard deviation)15 
Country Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 5.5060 2.5240 1.1605 4.5235 
HK 2.3209 4.7933 3.1492 2.3303 
IND 3.2535 1.4789 2.1303 2.837 
MAL 0.8334 5.9325 3.7502 1.6157 
SIN 2.7254 4.7117 4.7665 2.6865 
PAK 1.9484 1.7090 1.9607 1.8883 
INS 1.3884 1.0025 2.3497 2.7316 
PHI 3.5089 1.7339 0.8565 2.7093 
SK 2.5463 3.4989 3.7156 2.3027 
THA 2.1779 6.8737 1.4787 3.3638 
     
Averages     
NIT 2.7646 3.5249 2.8196 2.6469 
IT 2.4054 3.2773 2.1001 2.7769 
Excluding INS 2.7444 4.0355 2.0169 2.7919 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in standard deviation of Growth between Samples 
      
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
      
Constant      a0  4.2254 1.9742 4.3009 1.6995 4.5164 
P-Value 0.0033 0.0617 0.0073 0.1334 0.0073 
      
IT Dummy    a1 -0.9021 -0.6601 -0.8135 -0.9649 -1.0958 
P-Value 0.2748 0.4455 0.3943 0.3378 0.1465 
      
Initial Value a2 -1.5085 -0.7602 -1.5358 -0.6822 -1.6410 
P-Value 0.0017 0.0076 0.0043 0.0266 0.0064 
      
R-Square 0.7793 0.6675 0.7754 0.6380 0.7261 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.7163 0.5725 0.7006 0.5173 0.6479 
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 The calculations have been done using methodology of Ball & Sheridan, 2005 
Table 6: Volatility of Output Gap (measured as Standard Deviation)16 
Country Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 6.2095 4.9881 3.7793 6.1392 
HK 5.4632 4.5784 4.4537 4.7588 
IND 4.7021 3.6417 3.4937 4.3420 
MAL 3.6890 4.8526 2.9507 4.2651 
SIN 4.0336 3.8334 3.0500 4.1001 
PAK 1.7867 1.4569 1.8923 1.6903 
INS 4.5967 8.4693 4.5730 5.3515 
PHI 4.4615 3.3819 2.9685 4.0202 
SK 4.6707 3.7566 2.9980 4.5765 
THA 4.3555 5.2263 2.4856 4.6294 
     
Averages     
NIT  4.3140 3.8919 3.2700 4.2159 
IT 4.5211 5.2085 3.2563 4.6444 
Excluding INS 4.4959 4.1216 2.8174 4.4087 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in standard deviation of output gap between Samples 
      
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  
Constant       a0 0.9792 1.7623 1.0256 1.8487 0.9076 
P-Value 0.2809 0.0129 0.0598 0.0658 0.3639 
      
IT Dummy     a1 -0.1236 -0.5237 -0.5472 -0.5365 -0.4439 
P-Value 0.7740 0.2524 0.0623 0.2887 0.3728 
      
Initial Value  a2 -0.4690 -0.6126 -0.4797 -0.6348 -0.4396 
P-Value 0.0386 0.0015 0.0027 0.0193 0.0755 
      
R-Square 0.4905 0.8420 0.8388 0.6714 0.4720 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.3450 0.7969 0.7851 0.5618 0.3212 
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 The output gap is calculated as difference of Ln RGDP and trend value of Ln RGDP after applying Hodrick-
Prescott Filter.  
Table 7: Volatility of Short Term Interest Rate (measured as Standard Deviation)17 
Country Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
CHN 1.6244 3.4333 0.5218 2.5351 
HK 3.6933 0.7020 1.9240 1.5183 
IND 5.0108 5.5927 8.5306 5.3529 
MAL 2.0486 2.1740 0.3230 1.9570 
SIN 1.4863 1.3430 0.9887 1.3848 
PAK 2.0081 2.5599 2.9834 2.5762 
INS 3.1183 20.2227 3.7107 2.7628 
PHI 2.6833 3.2438 0.4099 3.0406 
SK 2.8648 3.1174 2.5555 2.4387 
THA 2.9528 5.7651 1.2276 3.2309 
     
Averages     
NIT  2.6453 2.6342 2.5452 2.5540 
IT 2.9048 8.0873 1.9759 2.8683 
Excluding INS 2.8336 4.0421 1.3977 2.9035 
 
Regression (1) 
 − 	 =   +  
 + 	 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in standard deviation of Interest rate between Samples 
      
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  
Constant      a0 -2.5329 1.9620 -2.4319 -0.1221 -2.2088 
P-Value 0.1305 0.1214 0.1538 0.9425 0.1453 
      
IT Dummy    a1 -1.0676 -1.7767 -1.5020 -2.5733 -1.6402 
P-Value 0.3350 0.3711 0.2323 0.1900 0.1479 
      
Initial Value a2  0.9197 -0.7786 0.8815 0.0126 0.8614 
P-Value 0.1100 0.0025 0.1327 0.9810 0.1072 
      
R-Square 0.3638 0.8332 0.4248 0.3017 0.4306 
Adjusted R-Sqr 0.1821 0.7855 0.2331 0.0689 0.2680 
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 The calculations have been done using methodology of Ball & Sheridan, 2005 
Table 8: Multivariate Results 
Phillip Curve Co-efficient 
Weigthed Averages    
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
NIT  4.3943 -1.1663 1.0557 3.5250 
IT 3.7578 4.4502 3.7406 0.3681 
Excluding INS 2.1508 3.0795 4.5954 -0.4920 
 
 − 	 =   + 
 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in estimated co-efficient between Samples 
Weighted Least Square 
       
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  Ex INS 
Constant      a0 -0.4334 2.3417 -0.4335 2.3417 -6.1755 -0.3714 
P-Value 0.7867 0.5560 0.8004 0.5827 0.0000 0.7527 
       
IT Dummy    a1 -2.9345 -6.2756 -3.9199 -4.3929 -20.9801 0.0265 
P-Value 0.6915 0.7454 0.6702 0.8524 0.0002 0.9893 
       
 
Effect of Commodity Price Changes on Inflation 
Weigthed Averages    
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
NIT  0.0225 0.0318 0.0204 0.0119 
IT -0.0058 -0.0266 -0.0400 0.0124 
Excluding INS 0.0110 -0.0239 -0.0236 0.0121 
 
 − 	 =   + 
 +   
Dependent Variable: Change in estimated co-efficient between Samples 
Weighted Least Square 
       
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 5) (3 - 4) 
   Ex INS Ex INS  Ex INS 
Constant      a0 -0.0192 0.0172 -0.0192 0.0172 -0.0388 -0.0387 
P-Value 0.4445 0.1121 0.4579 0.1389 0.0117 0.0038 
       
IT Dummy    a1 -0.0477 -0.0052 -0.0469 -0.0054 0.0282 0.0499 
P-Value 0.1356 0.9595 0.1542 0.9604 0.5838 0.2371 
       
 
 Table 9:  Case of Emerging Economies (Uni-variate Results) 
 
Inflation Rate: 
 
Average Average Inflation Standard Deviation of Inflation 
 Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
IT 7.5650 10.2473 5.3866 6.9030 2.5733 9.5490 2.6327 2.7479 
NIT 7.8812 7.2381 3.5272 8.0032 3.6899 4.5260 1.6730 3.9619 
 
 Average Inflation Standard Deviation of Inflation 
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
Constant        a0 0.8232 0.5016 0.4640 1.5513 1.1341 1.4477 
P-Value 0.8045 0.6765 0.8944 0.1973 0.0318 0.2210 
IT Dummy      a1 1.9679 0.6015 2.2805 0.9965 0.3616 1.0287 
P-Value 0.3690 0.6228 0.3103 0.3512 0.5155 0.3351 
Initial Value    a2 -0.6569 -0.5820 -0.6172 -0.9670 -0.8809 -0.9431 
P-Value 0.1425 0.0083 0.1786 0.0115 0.0000 0.0097 
 
Output Growth: 
 
Average Average Growth Standard Devaition of Growth 
 Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
IT 6.3256 2.8335 5.0143 5.9950 2.3584 3.2034 1.5616 2.9349 
NIT 6.8889 5.8605 6.8085 6.9182 2.8853 2.9111 2.2504 2.7161 
 
 Average Growth Standard Deviation of Growth 
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
Constant        a0 5.9373 2.0794 5.4509 3.7077 1.8590 3.9595 
P-Value 0.0419 0.3167 0.0820 0.0012 0.0602 0.0167 
IT Dummy      a1 -1.7230 0.6483 -1.6131 -0.9549 -0.7281 -0.5511 
P-Value 0.2742 0.6227 0.3016 0.0688 0.3985 0.4163 
Initial Value    a2 -0.8735 -0.1931 -0.8038 -1.5051 -0.8655 -1.6292 
P-Value 0.0290 0.5503 0.0643 0.0003 0.0077 0.0086 
 
  
Interest Rate and Output Gap: 
 
Average Standard Deviation of IR Standard Deviation of Output Gap 
 Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
IT 2.9181 9.7439 1.7827 3.0115 4.4712 5.6925 3.3424 4.6670 
NIT 2.6730 3.4400 3.0897 3.1053 4.0968 3.7348 3.0290 4.1092 
 
 Standard Deviation of IR Standard Deviation of Output Gap  
 (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) (3 - 1) (3 - 2) (3 - 4) 
Constant        a0 -3.2955 2.1719 -4.0470 0.3984 2.0449 0.9685 
P-Value 0.0859 0.2757 0.1437 0.7372 0.0253 0.3314 
IT Dummy      a1 -1.8926 -2.9888 -1.0914 0.5090 -0.5232 0.0336 
P-Value 0.1366 0.3382 0.4621 0.4164 0.3044 0.9508 
Initial Value    a2 1.3888 -0.7332 1.2982 -0.3479 -0.6402 -0.4986 
P-Value 0.0454 0.0337 0.1206 0.1770 0.0048 0.0655 
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